Constructing Real Peace and Security in Latin America: Minimizing the 'Moral Hazard' Character of Security Institutions

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In June 2011 after months of Nicaraguan military operations along the San Juan River that divides Nicaragua and Costa Rica and a complaint about the provocation to the Organization of American States (OAS), the Costa Rican foreign ministry claimed that the Nicaraguan army was establishing a permanent presence on the San Juan River to permit easy access for Nicaraguan civilians to occupy disputed marshlands on the Isla Calero.[1] Costa Rican President Laura Chinchilla declared that the country, which does not have an army, would depend on 'the strength of reason and not the strength of arms,' and denounced the "undeserved aggression" by Nicaragua.[2]

Latin America is a region with few wars: in the last 30 years the 34-day war in 1995 between Ecuador and Peru war only cost some $250 million and likely caused the deaths of only 400 people,[3] and the 1982 Malvinas/Falklands War in which Argentina confronted the United Kingdom was not between Latin Americans. However, the use of military force in Latin America's interstate relations is, unfortunately, not rare. Using the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID)[4] standard for classification that is widely used by scholars of international relations, one finds dozens of such incidents in the last two decades in the region, including at least 17 MIDs between 2005-2011.[5] While most of these incidents fell into the realm of verbal threats and military displays, in the recent period they included the Venezuelan military blowing up gold mining dredges in an area it claims but which is recognized internationally as Guyanese, as well as the March 2008 Colombia attack on a FARC camp inside Ecuadorian territory.

Living in peace with one's neighbors surely must mean that a state does not expect a verbal threat from a neighbor, much less that one would be confronted by military mobilizations and actual military violence. Indeed, the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (Pact of Bogotá, 1948), one of the region's earliest confidence and security building mechanisms (CSBMs), stipulated that signatories 'agree to *refrain from the threat or the use of force, or from any other means of coercion* for the settlement of their controversies, and *to have recourse at all times to pacific procedures*'.[6] The notion that Latin America is a zone of peace simply because it has no major wars ignores the many international disputes spanning a large range of issues, from national boundaries to cross border illicit activities by non-state actors, tolerated or encouraged by governments,[7] and is an inadequate and misleading standard to declare that the region is peaceful.

This article examines why any use of force by one Latin American country against another continues to be considered a legitimate, if disagreeable, tool of foreign policy; one cannot imagine that it would be seen so among West European countries, or between the US and Canada. I argue that the fundamental explanation for the continued use of military force in intra-Latin American relations is found in the nature of the security architecture Latin Americans have constructed, both alone and in collaboration with the U.S. That architecture

creates a fundamental 'moral hazard' that both limits the severity of military conflict and makes its occurrence at low levels more likely. In the conclusion I consider the range of options for defusing militarised conflict when it arises without providing the foreign and domestic policy rewards that encourage it.

The Use of Force and the Role of Moral Hazard in Latin America

We can usefully classify the context in which a government decides to militarize its relations with another state with which it has a disagreement into five categories. For the purposes of the theoretical discussion we can assume three actors of relevance to the discussion: a government that initiates the use of force at some level (initiator), a government against whose policies that force was directed (target), and everyone else that might become involved in the dispute, from allies to institutions (third party). Examples are taken from my work.[8]

1) An initiator of militarization expects no material response of any negative consequence from either the target or third parties (e.g., Argentina's occupation of the Malvinas in 1982; Nicaragua's mobilization against Costa Rica in 2010).

2) An initiator begins, or a target responds, with a low level of force but is ready to escalate to higher levels of force, depending on the response of the other state (e.g., Argentina and Chile in the Beagle dispute in 1977-78 up to full mobilization and readiness).

3) An initiator militarizes, or a target responds with a militarized act, but expects a third party to intervene and lower the probability of escalation, especially to war (e.g., Ecuador as initiator in both 1981 and 1995).

4) An actor militarizes expecting no escalation but in the face of escalation finds the cost of backing down to outweigh the expected cost of fighting (e.g., Argentina in the Malvinas after the British task force appears in the region).

5)   An actor seeks war because it perceives the cost of fighting to be minimal and acceptable (e.g., El Salvador against Honduras in 1969).

In categories 1, 4 and 5 security institutions are too weak to affect the escalation. In the Nicaraguan mobilization against Costa Rica (an example of category1), the Nicaraguans knew Costa Rica had no military capability and simply told the OAS, to whom Costa Rica had appealed, that it had no jurisdiction on the issue and the OAS accepted that judgment. The weakness of an institution is also seen in the example in category 4. The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, ostensibly created to provide a hemispheric unified front in the face of extra-hemispheric military threats, could not come to Argentina's aid because the institution's key member (the United States) sided with and provided aid to the British outside of the context of that institution, rather than insist that the British negotiate (as it insisted to Britain and France in the Suez Crisis of 1956). And in category 5, El Salvador feared no sanctions from the OAS and was unconcerned about a war's impact on the Central American Common Market institutions, which collapsed as a result of the war. In category 2 third parties can only play an important role if the militarizing parties have convinced each other in the process that war is likely and its costs would be higher than its benefits (Argentina and Chile were militarily balanced with significant firepower); to interrupt the escalation, a third party may offer the two sides an opportunity and a context in which to negotiate their way down the ladder.

In contemporary Latin America most uses of force fall into categories 1 and 3. The unequal military balance between rivals in Latin America's current potential conflict dyads (Colombia-Venezuela, Colombia-Ecuador, Colombia-Nicaragua, Nicaragua-Costa Rica, Chile-Bolivia, Venezuela-Guyana, and Dominican Republic-Haiti) make category 2 incidents unlikely. Even if relations deteriorated once again among Colombia, Venezuela and Ecuador, Colombia could reasonably expect the US to step in and insure that the Bolivarians (Venezuela and Ecuador) could not ally and impose severe military costs on it. Consequently, thinking about the use of military force in Latin America means explaining why the costs of militarizing are so low for the initiator (category 1) and why even a weak state that can reasonably

expect a militarized response might initiate or respond with a use of force (category 3).

Low levels of militarised bargaining, such as verbal threats and displays of force, often meet with public support in a rally-around-the-flag response. Currently, governments in Latin America are unlikely to face condemnation at home for militarizing a dispute with a weaker country over issues that awaken nationalist sentiments. For example, even in the case of the Isla Calero dispute Nicaraguans believe that Costa Rica, a country without an army, could invade Nicaraguan territory.[9] The combination that brings domestic support for militarization is thus loss of something valuable to the national identity (e.g., Ecuador's view of itself as an Amazonian nation, Bolivia's perception that it needs a sovereign outlet to the sea) and fear of attack. If the Latin American regional security architecture could articulate a vision of a regional identity that transcends national identity (it does not have to replace it), establish a norm of no first use of force, and raise the cost to nations that engage in first use, Latin America could be well on its way to real peace and security.

Unfortunately, the regional security architecture either does not articulate these points or when it does, provides incentives for behaviour that actually undermine the process for achieving that vision, adopting that norm and imposing those costs.

Regional institutions respond to militarized conflict by seeking to lower the level of tensions through dialogue and negotiations. When the initiator of the use of force contests the status quo but is bilaterally weak, such a call for dialogue can create a 'moral hazard' in the region's security architecture. A moral hazard results when a party is endowed with an 'insurance policy' that diminishes the risks of a particular activity to a point at which the party perceives such risks to be low enough to engage in the activity; insurance providers seek to minimize moral hazard by excluding such activities from coverage or charging a premium that raises the cost to the insured to a point that dissuades such behaviour.

In previous work I have demonstrated that "moral hazard" possibilities may encourage hard line positions, even violence, by weaker parties in the dispute in the hope that an interested hemispheric community

might increase pressure on a rival to settle. Although the hemisphere rejoices that Ecuador and Peru have settled their dispute, we should not ignore the fact that it took a small war in 1995 and the threat of a large one in 1998 to help convince the parties to settle.[10] By guaranteeing that conquest will not be recognized and that escalation into a costly and long war will be unlikely, the OAS and the Four Guarantor countries helped convince Ecuador to engage in the adventurous behavior that developed into the short war of 1995. Because low-level militarisation provides benefits to the initiator at low risk, we can conclude that ironically regional security institutions actually promote this risky behaviour (category 3).

The moral hazard component of regional security institutions is a flaw in their institutional design. We need to understand why the institutions were designed in this manner in order to understand how and whether they can be modified to eliminate or reduce the moral hazard.

Latin America's Contemporary Security Architecture

Resolution of the Central American civil wars in the 1980s, and the return to democracy throughout the region in the 1990s, generated expectations that the region could develop into a security community in which the use of military force among its members was inconceivable, much as in Western Europe. Statesmen, aware of the potential for conflict, promoted CSBMs to facilitate peaceful relations in a region with numerous disagreements and historical rivalries. The extent and breadth of Latin America's security architecture makes it unique among developing countries: there is a wide array of international (e.g. International Court of Justice), regional, subregional and even bilateral institutions and they address both international and domestic threats.

Rhetorically, Latin America's contemporary security architecture is focused on virtually everything: e.g., the 2003 OAS "Declaration on Security in the Americas" uses a security concept which is 'multidimensional',[11] which simply means that it is the least common denominator in the region. The Fifth Defence Ministerial Conference (Santiago, 2003) noted that "the region has gradually advanced toward a complex security system made up of a network of new and old security insti-

tutions and regimes, both collective and cooperative, of hemispheric, regional, subregional and bilateral scope, which have in practice made up a new flexible security architecture."[12] Nevertheless, my research has demonstrated that the contemporary security institutions as they operate are overwhelmingly focused on two goals: the defense of national sovereignty and the protection of democracy.[13] Notice, the prevention of war and the avoidance of the use of force at lower levels of violence are not included. Since war is rare, it is not the focus of the institutions; since war is rare, the institutions respond to militarization by working to contain escalation to war. Because escalation to war is rare, everyone congratulates themselves that the regional security architecture works, with 'peace' as the result. Unfortunately, the result is also a proliferation of low level uses of force among Latin American nations.

The history of the region makes a focus on national sovereignty understandable. In the 19th century Europeans, and in the 20th century the U.S., intervened almost at will in Latin America, forcing governments there to acquiesce to policies preferred by these powerful outsiders and overthrowing governments that resisted such demands. Protecting sovereignty, consequently, has a high value in the region. That history also helps us understand the definition that Latin Americans gave to national sovereignty. The concept became defined not just as non-interference in a government's ability to make a decision but not doing anything to impose costs on a government for making a decision with which others disagree – hence the idea of determining whether a choice is legitimate or not, or of imposing sanctions as a result of a choice is itself considered illegitimate. Even the governments that ally with Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez (known as Bolivarians) adhere to this view since they perceive that Latin American governments with which they disagree are doing the bidding of the United States and 'capitalism', rather than acting for the good of their country's national sovereignty. Hence denouncing militarization by non-Bolivarian nations (e.g., an act by Colombia) is acceptable, but not that of a fellow Bolivarian (e.g., Nicaragua).

The emphasis on national sovereignty is inherent in the voluntary nature of all security mechanisms in the hemisphere. The aforementioned Pact of Bogotá is largely irrelevant because only fourteen of the

34 active members of the OAS (Cuba's membership is suspended) have signed it, and some signatories did so with sufficient reservations to call into question its relevance as a hemispheric instrument.[14] Even the newest Latin American regional organization, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) which excludes the U.S. and Canada, suffers from many of the same problems limiting governance capabilities and underming the creation of powerful CSBMs as the other organisations in the region.[15] The reigning peaceful resolution of conflict mechanisms cannot force a party to the negotiating table or to dialogue; the parties must be convinced it is in their interests to dialogue, but sanctions are not considered a legitimate means to get them there; whether or not to participate is seen as a sovereign decision.

The focus on sovereignty means that the Latin American community is reluctant to define criteria regarding behavior or develop verification methods to ensure that members are complying with their international commitments. While the Union of South American States (UNASUR) helped mediate the 2008 dispute among Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela, its exhortation that members not permit non-state actors to operate from their territory was not accompanied by verification requirements or criteria to ensure that the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) effectively lost its sanctuaries or access to resources in Venezuela or Ecuador. The Central American Integration System (SICA) has addressed the drug trade as a threat to security,[16] but does not take on the issue of military posturing and threats by one member-state against another, as in the ongoing situation between Nicaragua and Costa Rica.

The one instance in which the Latin American community is united in legitimating sanctions is linked to national sovereignty and constitutes the other the other focus of the security architecture, democracy. In Latin America sovereignty was historically perceived to lie in the *patria* (nation), not the people. Governing was justified and contested by various groups in the name of having the 'correct' understanding of the *patria's* needs at that historical moment; in this political struggle the military as the only truly national institution and creator of the *patria* in the wars of independence, often held the upper hand ideologically as well as through the force of arms. A competing view of sovereignty,

that it was class-based, lost out everywhere except in Cuba, partly because it could never satisfactorily resolve the national-class divide.

But in this Third Wave of democracy, and after the especially horrendous national security regimes of the 1970s and 1980s, Latin Americans have largely adopted the philosophically Liberal view that sovereignty resides in the people as individual citizens. The defense of democracy as the means by which the citizens exercise sovereignty became an almost natural and inevitable result. The Rio Group that organized to help defuse the Central American crises in the 1980s developed a democratic clause for membership and expelled Panama when that country held fraudulent elections in 1988. Latin American nations took a historic step when the OAS General Assembly adopted the Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal of the Inter-American System in 1991. Subregional organisations such as SICA and UNASUR followed suit. Thus national sovereignty is violated if democracy is overthrown even by forces from within the country.

The understanding of what it means to be a democracy may be changing in unsystematic ways that will undermine the link between democracy and national sovereignty. In the spring of 2005, President Luis Gutierrez criticized the OAS and the Inter-American Democratic Charter for not preventing his overthrow by a legislative coup.[17] In June 2005 the Nicaraguan Assembly rejected President Enrique Bolaños call for an OAS team to help resolve the country's constitutional crisis, saying that the issue was an internal affair.[18] These two episodes, and others, demonstrate that the Latin American community was not interested in evaluating whether the overthrow of an elected government by some citizens and their legislators constituted the overthrow of democracy; only efforts by the armed forces or police to force a president out of office fell into this category (Venezuela 2002, Honduras 2009, Ecuador 2010). But the July 2012 suspension of Paraguay from the Common Market of the South (Mercosur) and UNASUR because, while the legislature followed the letter of the law in impeaching President Fernando Lugo, they violated due process along the way, is a potential watershed in the defense of democracy in the region.

The decisions taken by Mercosur and UNASUR send the message that removal of Presidents will be evaluated by the regional community and sanctioned if found inappropriate. Nevertheless, the action also raises

serious challenges for these two institutions, and any that would follow in their footsteps, in future episodes in the defense of democracy. The quick and unilateral manner in which Paraguay was suspended raises the question of whether the institutions themselves violated due process in responding to the Paraguayan situation, and if so, whether there was an ulterior motive behind the action. Secondly, and illustrated by the OAS problems in enforcing its own democracy clause, Mercosur and UNASUR have not developed or defined the standards for democracy nor the process by which an accused can defend themselves against the charges. Are violent protests in the streets in hopes of forcing the President to resign illegitimate tools and thus resignations resulting from them grounds for suspension of the country, at least until new and peaceful elections can be held? Can a legislature which loses its supermajority in an election delegate decree powers to a President for a period of time as a means of limiting the opposition's ability to block future legislation requiring a supermajority (as happened in Venezuela in 2010)? What about a Constituent Assembly process that proceeds even as pro-government demonstrators keep opposition delegates from entering the building to vote (as occurred in Bolivia in 2007)? And who will evaluate elections that are widely accused of irregularities (as in Nicaraguan municipal elections of 2008) in order that the institutions can decide whether the government has violated the community's democracy clause?

Latin American actions on Cuba also represent a contradiction and a challenge for Latin America's focus on democracy. Few in Latin America believe Cuba is a democracy, but it is also true that the Cuban government did not overthrow a democracy. The historical peculiarity of the Cuban Revolution and the US embargo makes many Latin American states perceive that the path to democratization in Cuba lies in incorporating it into the regional community. The Rio Group admitted Cuba in 2008, a path for its reincorporation into the OAS was created in 2009, it is a member of the newly created CELAC, and Latin American leaders insisted at the 2012 Summit of the Americas that an invitation to Cuba to participate in the next Summit meeting is a prerequisite. But if Cuba makes no significant progress towards at the very least some form of electoral democracy and a formally free press, there is no philosophical basis for claiming that the Cuban government represents 'national sovereignty.' The Cuban exception could

thus undermine the link between national sovereignty and democracy that underpins Latin America's contemporary security architecture. The implications could be profound.

Institutions, not Regional Leaders

If one were discussing Latin America's regional security architecture prior to the 21st century pride of place would be given to the United States. Some would argue that Brazil deserves that standing today, at least as regards South America. I argue, however, that regional leadership is weak, with the US and Brazil preferring to work with institutions that they cannot control and thus we need to keep the focus on institutions.

The United States used to play the major role in Latin America's security architecture, often in very destabilizing ways. But its influence in the security realm has declined as the country overextended itself militarily and diplomatically in a global war on terror, and suffers from an important economic slowdown. The US retains influence, nevertheless. The US successfully defended the new Honduran government of Porfirio Lobo after the civil-military coup in 2009, resulting in its reluctant acceptance first by Central Americans, and then by the hemispheric community. US support of Colombia after the 2008 military incursion into Ecuador facilitated Colombia's perception that it had acted legitimately in defence of its national interests. Whatever soft power the US has in the region as a whole is significantly diminished by Hugo Chávez and his Bolivarian Alliance's direct contestation of US authority in the region; even Brazil's more respectful position regarding US interests in the region comes in the name of increased Latin American autonomy. In the unlikely event of a major war in Latin America, however, especially if it involved an extra-hemispheric actor in some way, the US would find the resources to determine the outcome, at least in the short term.

As the profile of the U.S. fades, Brazil has emerged as a potential regional stabiliser. Brazil uses its 'soft power' based on a longstanding professional diplomatic corps at the Foreign Ministry (aka Itamaraty), insightful Presidential intervention at key moments (for example,

amid the tension created by Bolivia's nationalization of Petrobras assets), public and private investment and aid for the region, and a new willingness to develop solidarity with Latin America. Brazil articulates a regional vision of cooperation, with economic integration, political alliance and shared values (social justice, democracy and human rights) forming the basis for peaceful relations. Brazil's view of conflict management is ultimately to build confidence in order to avoid tensions and it believes that this is best accomplished through institutions that emphasize national sovereignty. Of course, this also fits Brazilian domestic interests, as it has rejected the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights' ability to rule on how the country decides to build dams in the Amazon and the 2008 National Strategy of Defense rejects the legitimacy of Brazilian citizens working with foreign NGOs in challenging government decisions for the Amazon region.

Brazil has clear aspirations to be recognized as a major power so has to tread carefully within the region, facilitating dialogue between parties and leading multilateral mitigation initiatives that represent minimal risk of failure and do not create bilateral problems for itself. The result is that it prefers to work through the existing security architecture rather than reform it in ways that de-legitimize or raise the cost of initiating the use of military force among Latin American nations.

Working Toward Peace and Security

The analysis presented here argues that Latin America is not on the path that will take it toward interstate peace and security. But there are paths that can lead there, even ones that do not violate the focus on national sovereignty and democracy. As the evolution of the democracy requirement itself indicates, Latin American governments can make fundamental changes in how they perceive and pursue peace and security, and they can evaluate and sanction behavior. The options examined here do not reject the notion of national sovereignty or democracy; rather they build on these primary concepts to suggest ways in which the region could virtually eliminate the use of military force in relations among Latin American states.

The most fundamental and far-reaching change would be to develop a regional norm against the first use of military force in relations among members of the community. If that norm were developed governments would willingly forego the option of militarizing and thus no one's national sovereignty (as currently defined) would be violated. In the absence of significant costs in the militarization of regional relations, however, it is difficult to see how this norm could be developed and accepted by all. The democracy norm was developed only after the horrors of the national security dictatorships and it is in the immediate self-interest of governments in office. Neither of those conditions hold when we are discussing low level use of force.

A more reasonable starting point might be with the concept of national sovereignty. Defining national sovereignty as the ability of a government to choose a policy based on what it wants without considering the responses of others is both misleading and not useful for thinking about international relations. Once a country makes a decision others will respond to it in line with their own views, so the outcome of the policy choice is not determined by the choice itself. Consequently, the options facing any government making a policy choice always have associated costs in those outcomes that will be considered to some degree by the policymakers. 'Sovereignty,' therefore is more appropriately defined as the ability of a government to decide *what options it will choose* in responding to international challenges and opportunities.[19] It is not the ability to decide to do whatever one wants or to be immune to the reactions of others. Every actor on the international stage is constantly making choices in terms of what they want to do and how much they believe they would need to 'pay' (not just in monetary terms, but also in terms of reputational and opportunity costs) for the options that they are considering. Imposing costs on members for violating community norms or rules thus does not violate national sovereignty, it only adds to the costs a government must consider.

If the definition of national sovereignty changed in this direction regional security institutions could be designed to impose costs on initiators of military force in intra-community relations. It would be important for the institutions to have explicit criteria for determining when militarization has occurred (if the institutions can sanction, then it will be in the interest of rival states to lie about the behavior of the

other), a mechanism for evaluation, and a dispute resolution process. The sanctioning of first use, no matter the excuse, would eliminate the moral hazard in current regional security institutions.

If one assumes that the democratic peace phenomenon exists (and at least rhetorically it does in Latin America) one must think seriously and critically about the democracy clause in Latin America. Democratic peace theorists argue that norms and institutions of a particular type restrain the use of military force in interstate conflict. The relevant norm develops from the Liberal principle that dissenting views are considered inherently legitimate, while the dispersal of policymaking power that develops via constraints on the Executive creates an institutional structure that makes it less likely to garner support for international conflict. Given these theoretical underpinnings, we should not expect democracies that lack these characteristics to be particularly unwilling to use force internationally. In fact, some democratic peace theorists have argued that the period of democratization is a particularly dangerous time for war because leaders can use nationalist appeals and the democratic process to raise fear of neighboring states and peoples among the citizenry in order to silence critics and consolidate power at home.[20]

Yet applications of the democratic peace argument in Latin America refuse to engage in the requisite discrimination among governments to distinguish among which nations a democratic peace can be constructed and which governments in fact represent a threat to peace in the region. The very notion of a 'participatory' rather than Liberal democracy needs to be analyzed for its normative and institutional logics to determine whether the democratic peace outcome can still be expected to result. Consequently, if the new inter-American security institutions seek to promote peace and security via the defense of democracies they would need to not only support unconsolidated democracies, but promote the quick movement out of this dangerous transition phase.

In the absence of a norm change, or of the understanding of what national sovereignty entails, or perhaps in the character of democracy in the region, the temptation to coerce one's neighbor will continue to plague Latin America. The reality of that violent peace will continue to stimulate costly arms purchases as Latin American rivals engage in

militarized bargaining and seek to attract or block third parties' interests. Expenditures to insure that one cannot be coerced by their Latin American neighbor will continue to generate significant opportunity costs in a region with social and economic needs, and occasionally flare up into war. The illusion of peace needs to be unmasked so Latin Americans can rethink the bases for their own regional relations.

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ABSTRACT

Constructing Real Peace and Security in Latin America: Minimizing the 'Moral Hazard' Character of Security Institutions

Why is the use of force by one Latin American country against another considered a legitimate, if disagreeable, tool of foreign policy? Threatening and coercing one's neighbor does not make for a peaceful community. I argue that the fundamental explanation for the continued use of military force in intra-Latin American relations is found in the

nature of the security architecture Latin Americans have constructed and suggest reforms that could make peace in the region real.

Resumen

La construcción de paz y seguridad reales en América Latina: Cómo minimizar el "riesgo moral" de las instituciones de seguridad

¿Por qué el uso de la fuerza por parte de un país latinoamericano contra otro es considerado una herramienta legítima, aunque desagradable, de política exterior? Si amenazamos y coaccionamos a nuestro vecino no vamos a lograr una comunidad en paz. El autor plantea que la explicación fundamental para el uso continuo de fuerza militar en las relaciones intra-latinoamericanas radica en la naturaleza de la arquitectura de seguridad desarrollada en América Latina y sugiere reformas que permitirían lograr una paz verdadera en la región.

Summario

A construção da paz e da segurança reais na América Latina: Como minimizar o "risco moral" das instituições de segurança

Por que o uso da força por um país latino-americano contra outro é considerado uma ferramenta legítima, embora desagradável, de política exterior? Se ameaçamos e coagimos o nosso vizinho, não vamos construir uma comunidade em paz. Segundo o autor, a explicação fundamental para o uso contínuo da força militar nas relações intra-latino-americanas reside na natureza da arquitetura de segurança desenvolvida no região. Sugere, então, reformas que permitiriam alcançar uma paz verdadeira na América Latina.